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We evaluate returns to General Educational Development (GED) cer-
tification for high school dropouts using state administrative data. We
apply a fuzzy regression discontinuity method to account for test tak-
ers retaking the test. For women we find that GED certification has no
statistically significant effect on either employment or earnings. For
men we find a significant increase in earnings in the second year after
taking the test but no impact in subsequent years. GED certification
increases postsecondary school enrollment by 4–8 percentage points.
Our results differ from regression discontinuity approaches that fail to
account for test retaking.
I. Introduction
Labor market opportunities for high school dropouts have declined sub-
stantially in recent years. Certification on the General Educational De-
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velopment (GED) test provides potential benefits to dropouts. Dropouts
with GED certification may be able to signal to employers that they have
higher skills than the “average” dropout. Many postsecondary institu-
tions require high school graduation or GED certification for admission
to degree-seeking programs.
In this paper, we evaluate the labor market returns to GED certifica-
tion using state administrative data. We apply a fuzzy regression disconti-
nuity method to account for the fact that GED test takers can repeatedly
retake the test until they pass it and that GED certification depends on
meeting subtest requirements. Previous analyses of the GED based on re-
gression discontinuity methods have used as a forcing variable a compos-
ite test score that includes scores obtained by retaking the test. Because
this approach ignores the fact that individuals choose whether to retake
the test, estimates are subject to bias. Our approach, based on the dis-
continuity on the score from the first test taken, can be applied to other
situations in which program participation is determined by a score on a
test that can be retaken multiple times. Examples of tests to which this
technique can be applied include civil service exams, bar exams, votes
for unionization, and licensure exams such as drivers’ licenses.
We find that, for dropouts who take the GED and score near the cut-
off, the estimated effects of GED certification on either employment or
earnings are generally small and not statistically significant, with the ex-
ception of an increase in earnings for males five to nine quarters after
taking the test. GED certification increases postsecondary participation
in the year following certification by up to 4 percentage points for
men and up to 8 percentage points for women. Finally, the results from
our preferred model often differ from results of a sharp regression dis-
continuity design, which ignores the ability of students to retake the test.
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are precluded from sharing the data with others. Researchers interested in replicating
our results would need to apply to DESE and DOLIR for the data. We would be happy
to provide assistance and computer code to go from the raw data to the results of the paper.
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II. Relation to Previous Literature
Heckman, Humphries, and Kautz (2014) and Heckman and Kautz
(2014) provide the most comprehensive analysis of the labor market re-
turns to the GED. In addition to reviewing previous work, starting with
Cameron and Heckman (1993), they estimate the GED impact across
six survey data sets, including the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
and the National Educational Longitudinal Survey of 1988. In general,
they find no evidence of a GED impact on labor market earnings or par-
ticipation for men compared to dropouts, but for women they find some
evidence of higher annual earnings, driven by higher labor force partic-
ipation. They show that this pattern of results is largely consistent with
much of the previous work using survey data.1
Among the most widely read papers related to the GED is Tyler, Mur-
nane, and Willett (2000b), which reports positive effects of GED certifi-
cation on earnings for whites (males and females) but not for nonwhites.
Estimates of the effects of GED are based on a comparison of test takers
in states with different GED passing thresholds, essentially comparing
test takers who receive certification with others who have identical test
scores but do not. Heckman et al. (2014) point out that this method is
similar to a regression discontinuity approach, as it focuses on differences
in GED certification between individuals with similar GED test scores.2
Using a similar approach for a smaller set of states, Tyler, Murnane, and
Willett (2000a) find a consistent, positive association between GED cer-
tification and annual earnings for nonwhite males, white females, and
nonwhite females.
A major limitation in the studies by Tyler et al. (2000a, 2000b) is that
they use a composite test score based on multiple test attempts as their
forcing variable in a regression discontinuity analysis. Rubinstein (2003)
and Heckman et al. (2014) highlight multiple sources of bias in the es-
timated GED effect using this method, as well as pointing out concerns
in the disparity in findings between the two Tyler et al. papers. One
source of potential bias is that test takers can manipulate the composite
score by retaking parts of the test until they receive a passing score,
which potentially invalidates the basic assumption of regression discon-
tinuity analysis. As we show below, the first GED test attempt generates a
valid regression discontinuity estimator, but Tyler et al.’s composite score
does not.
1 Because of the extensive literature review contained in the work of Heckman and
coauthors, we focus our discussion on papers that use a methodology similar to ours for
estimating the impact of the GED. Readers who are interested in a more general review
of this literature should refer to Heckman et al. (2014) and Heckman and Kautz (2014).
2 The web appendix from Heckman et al. (2014), available at http://jenni.uchicago
.edu/Studies_of_GED/, contains a detailed explanation of the identification strategy used
in Tyler et al. (2000b), along with an explanation of the limitations of that strategy.
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Papers related to those by Tyler et al. include Tyler (2004) and
Loftstrom and Tyler (2008), both of which utilize individual-level admin-
istrative earnings records matched with records of GED test takers to
compare male GED recipients with dropouts who took but did not pass
the GED. Using data from Florida, Tyler (2004) finds positive long-run
earnings effects, whereas using Texas data, Lofstrom and Tyler (2008)
find no impact of the GED—identified through the state’s 1997 increase
in the passing standard—on earnings.
Both the Tyler (2004) and Loftstrom and Tyler (2008) papers use sev-
eral techniques including ordinary least squares (OLS) and individual
fixed-effects models, as well as regression discontinuity (RD) analysis.
While OLS and fixed-effects models suffer from potential bias due to
omitted measures of motivation or noncognitive ability, RDmodels offer
the potential of overcoming such problems. However, these studies use
the same composite test score as a forcing variable in their RD design as
Tyler et al. (2000a, 2000b), so they are subject to the same biases as those
studies.
Our analysis provides several contributions to the GED literature.
First, we use administrative data from a single state for nearly 100,000 in-
dividuals who took the GED between 1995 and 2005. We match these
data with earnings data covering the period 1993–2009, providing us
with earnings for several years before and after individuals took the
GED. The extended follow-up period allows us to examine the persis-
tence of the impact of GED certification on earnings. The use of admin-
istrative data complements the work using panel survey data with much
smaller sample sizes.
Second, as noted above, the previous GED research using RD analysis
failed to account for the ability of students to retake the GED. Our anal-
ysis illustrates how estimates that do not explicitly account for retaking
are not valid, and we use a technique based on the score from the first
GED test to produce valid RD estimates. Thus, we provide the first esti-
mates of GED impacts based on administrative data that account for the
retaking behavior of GED test takers.
Little previous work has addressed the issue of test retaking with re-
spect to RD models. In partial exceptions, Pantal, Podgursky, and
Mueser (2006) consider a test used for allocating a scholarship, and
Martorell and McFarlin (2011) consider a college placement test. Both
use a first test score as a forcing variable to eliminate the impact of test
retaking in an RD framework, but neither considers the significance of
this choice.3
3 Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) implement an RDmodel examining the impact
of municipal bond referenda that allows for multiple referenda, but their methods of es-
timation rely on assumptions that are not applicable in a testing context.
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Finally, it is important to recognize that our analysis compares out-
comes for people who take and pass the GED with those for individuals
who take and fail to pass the GED. To the extent that high school drop-
outs who take the GED are more motivated than high school dropouts
who do not take the GED, and this motivation is valued in the labor mar-
ket, our analysis implicitly controls for possible differences in motiva-
tion. Of course, this also means that our results need not generalize to
high school dropouts who choose not to take the GED.
III. GED Test and GED Data
Nationwide, nearly 700,000 people took theGED test in 2008, and 73 per-
cent of these received GED certification. The GED test is a 7½-hour
test consisting of five subtests (reading, writing, social studies, science,
and mathematics). The version of the GED introduced in 2002—and re-
ferred to as the 2002 GED—replaced the previous version, which had
been in place since 1988; the current version of the GED has been in
place since 2014 (GED Testing Service 2013). Subject to certain con-
straints, states set their own criteria for certification based on test perfor-
mance, but differences between states are minor. As recently as the
1990s, there were some differences across states in the score required
for certification, but such differences were small. By the 2000s, standards
for passing were all but universal across states.
To obtain GED certification, test takers in our data must obtain a min-
imum score on each of the five subtests and must obtain a total test score
of at least 2250 out of a maximum of 4000. Certification is based on a
composite score computed as the sum of the highest score on each sub-
test taken over the prior 2 years; that is, each subtest score is “valid” for
2 years before it expires. Many individuals with scores below the required
thresholds retake the test—often several times—within 2 years, and they
often retake only certain subjects rather than retaking the entire exam.4
The advent of the 2002 version of the GED test altered the certifica-
tion criteria in several ways. First, the minimum permitted subtest score
prior to 2002 was 400, and this was raised to 410 (missing subtest scores
are coded as zeros). Further, scores from earlier versions could not be
combined with the 2002 version, so students who had taken the exam
prior to 2002 but had not passed it had to meet the criteria based on
their scores on the new version of the test. For this reason, and also be-
cause it was widely believed that the new test version would impose
higher standards, we explore the sensitivity of our findings by estimating
separate models for each time period (1995–2001 and 2002–5).
4 Individuals can take the 2002 GED test up to six times in any 2-year period. A given
version of the test includes multiple forms that are normed to the same scale, so when a
student retakes the exam, the particular questions are different.
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Our basic sample consists of any individual who took the GED test for
the first time in one state between 1995 and 2005.5 For each individual
taking the test within this period, we have access to data on the most re-
cent 10 test scores taken for each version of the test, whenever the tests
were taken. We exclude individuals who have taken either version of the
test 10 or more times because we cannot identify the first test; there were
86 individuals excluded for this reason. We exclude individuals who took
the GED test while incarcerated because their labor market outcomes
are likely constrained by their incarceration.6 We exclude individuals
with missing information on gender or race. Individuals who received
their GED through the DANTES program, which provides state certifica-
tion for tests taken by military personnel outside the state, are also ex-
cluded because test scores are not reported for program participants
who took the GED test through this program. Finally, we exclude indi-
viduals who took the GED as part of the GED Option program because
these individuals are still enrolled in high school and therefore are fun-
damentally different from our sample of high school dropouts who take
the GED. Descriptive statistics for the regression sample are in Appendix
tables A1 and A2.7
Quarterly earnings in all unemployment insurance covered jobs are
available as reported by employers in states’ unemployment insurance
programs for the state and a neighboring state. Very few of the state’s res-
idents commute to states other than these two. We use data through the
second quarter of 2009.
We also look at how passing the GED affects employment and whether
someone is enrolled in postsecondary schooling. We define employment
as whether someone has positive earnings in a quarter. We measure post-
secondary enrollment on the basis of state records identifying whether
an individual was enrolled in courses at a state 2- or 4-year college or uni-
versity.
Although our data pertain to a single state, this state is quite typical of
the United States. The industrial structure is similar to that of the United
States as a whole, and earnings and wages are within 10 percent of the US
average. The proportion of the population that is African American is
slightly below the national average. The proportion Hispanic is substan-
tially below the US average but similar to that of most states.
Table 1 provides a tabulation of the GED scores on the first test taken
and an indicator of whether the test was later retaken, for individuals tak-
5 We draw on interviews with state agency personnel in our description of the state GED
data and procedures.
6 Tyler (2004) also points out that GED recipients with criminal records may have differ-
ent labor market returns to a GED because of their criminal history.
7 As discussed later, the regression sample used in our main analysis below is limited
to individuals with test scores between 1500 and 3000, whereas samples in table 1 and in
figs. 1–3 include scores outside this range.
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ing the exam for the first time in the period of our study, 1995–2005. The
overwhelming majority of individuals in our study—nearly 80 percent—
obtain a score above the total passing threshold of 2250. It is therefore
important to keep in mind that an RD design will provide an estimate
of the impact for those near the threshold, individuals whose test perfor-
mance is substantially below the median. If GED certification impacts for
this group are substantially different from those for other GED recipi-
ents, our measures may not be representative, although policy makers
seem particularly concerned about the impact of the GED on low-skill
individuals.8
The table also shows the proportion of the test takers who retake the
test within the period of our study. The bottom line in the table (col. 3)
indicates that only about 16 percent of the test takers take the test more
than once. Previous studies using RD methods have pointed to such
small proportions to justify analyses that ignore test retaking. However,
the overall likelihood of retaking the test is misleading in the case at
hand. The large majority of scores that satisfy the GED passing criteria
with the first test are not relevant for the RD analysis because they are
far from the passing threshold. Column 3 shows that for those who do
not pass, test retaking is very common. Among those with scores in
the range 2200–2240, just below the passing threshold, almost 70 per-
cent retake the GED test, and for those with lower scores, more than half
of the initial test takers retake the test. Of those who just barely meet the
8 Previous work has argued that the labor market benefits of the GED are greater for
individuals with low cognitive abilities (Murnane, Willett, and Tyler 2000; Tyler, Murnane,
and Willett 2003), although the evidence is not entirely consistent.
TABLE 1
Test Performance and Test Retaking:
First-Time Test Takers, 1995–2005
Score Rangea Number Distribution (%) Retake (%)
0–990 1,009 1.0 65.7
1000–1490 897 .9 51.7
1500–1740 1,410 1.5 37.6
1750–1990 4,787 4.9 42.9
2000–2090 4,223 4.4 52.9
2100–2140 2,798 2.9 57.0
2150–2190 3,423 3.5 62.0
2200–2240 3,946 4.1 68.9
2250–2290 4,398 4.5 20.9
2300–2340 4,879 5.0 14.0
2350–2490 16,343 16.9 6.8
2500–2740 24,967 25.8 1.6
2750–3090 18,173 18.8 .4
3100–4000 5,630 5.8 .2
Total 96,883 100.0 16.1
a Only test scores that are multiples of 10 are awarded.
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threshold (those with total scores of 2250–2290), more than a fifth re-
take the test, reflecting their need to satisfy the minimum required score
on each of the five subtests.
In the analysis that follows, we will define GED certification in two
ways. First, when we present basic statistics on GED certification, we mea-
sure GED certification as having received GED certification during the
entire sample period, that is, by the end of 2008. This definition is the
most inclusive and avoids the challenges of reporting multiple measures
of GED certification. In practice, the vast majority of people who ulti-
mately receive certification receive it within 2 years of first taking the test.
Second, when we look at the effect of GED certification on quarterly
earnings, employment, and postsecondary enrollment, we measure GED
certification at the start of the quarter in which the outcome is measured.
For example, when the dependent variable is quarterly earnings, 12 quar-
ters after the initial GED test, GED certification is measured as of the start
of the twelfth quarter.
Test score: Examining discontinuities.—The discussion above makes clear
that individuals whose scores are close to the passing threshold are very
likely to retake the GED test; yet it is the “final” test score—obtained by
combining the highest subtests taken over a 2-year period—that deter-
mines GED certification. Consequently, the final test score is an obvious
candidate for a conventional RD analysis. Such an approach ignores
both the fact that some individuals retake the test and that some whose
scores meet the overall test score threshold do not satisfy the minimum
on each of the subtest scores.
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the final test scores for individu-
als who took the GED test in 1995–2005. The sample of test takers is
slightly different from that considered above because individuals may
have taken their first test prior to this period. The vertical axis identifies
the number of individuals who obtain a given test score as a proportion
of the total number, so the “bin size” for density calculations is a single
score (possible test scores are multiples of 10). The trend line fits a local
linear regression that is based on a triangular kernel with a bandwidth
covering eight scores (80 points), allowing for a potential discontinuity
at the threshold 2250.9
The discontinuity in the density for the final test score is extraordi-
nary. The log discontinuity is close to 1.05, implying that the density
to the right of 2250 is nearly three times that immediately to the left, a
difference that is statistically significant at better than the 0.1 percent
level (i.e., p < .001). Even though only 16 percent of individuals retake
the test, the very high retake probability for those close to the cutoff
point causes a dramatic redistribution in the final score.
9 These methods correspond to those recommended by McCrary (2008).
628 journal of political economy
Given that the final test score displays a marked discontinuity, it would
appear highly likely that there would be discontinuities in the values for
relevant characteristics. Those who choose to retake the test would be ex-
pected to differ from those who do not, perhaps reflecting different
noncognitive traits, causing those with scores just above the threshold
to differ systematically from those below. Such differences might well
be associated with measured personal characteristics. In order to test
for a discontinuity in a demographic variable X (which we define below),
we fit a fourth-order polynomial in the test score, allowing for the func-
tion to change discontinuously at 2250:
X 5 ax 1 axrDr 1o​
4
j51
fbxl j ½Dlðscore2 2250Þ j
þbxr j ½Dr ðscore2 2250Þjg þ ϑ:
The term Dr (Dl) is a dummy variable indicating whether that score
equals or exceeds (is below) the passing threshold, and score is the final
score on the GED test. The variables bxlj and bxrj are estimated coeffi-
cients that capture the relationship between the GED score and the
dependent variable, and the coefficient axr identifies the extent of any
discontinuity, providing an estimate of the mean difference on the de-
pendent variable between those just above the threshold and those just
below. The model is fitted on the sample of test scores between 1500 and
3000.
Table 2 (col. 1) provides estimates for this parameter, where the vari-
able X is one of the following: gender (male), race (nonwhite), age,
FIG. 1.—Distribution of last test score: 1995–2005
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whether the test taker took the test more than once, and earnings in the
quarter prior to taking the test. There are several statistically significant
differences for the final test score. The proportion of nonwhites is ap-
proximately 3 percentage points higher above the threshold than below,
a difference that is easily statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The proportion of males is 3.2 percentage points lower above the thresh-
old, and those just above the threshold are also slightly younger, differ-
ences significant at the 10 percent level. Finally, we see that those above
the threshold are more likely to have retaken the test. This reflects the
fact that many individuals exceed the threshold by virtue of taking the
test more than once.10
10 As a robustness check for our methods, we tested for discontinuities at the median for
all scores below the threshold and at the median for all scores above. Of the 24 coefficient
estimates to identify discontinuities for the four demographic measures, only one was sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level, and one was significant at the 10 percent level.
TABLE 2
Discontinuity in Estimates for the Distribution of Test
Takers’ Characteristics, 1995–2005
Final Test Score
(1)
One-Time Test Takers
(2)
First Test
(3)
Male:
Coefficient 2.032 2.073 2.020
(.019)* (.024)** (.015)
Observations 85,402 71,854 86,345
Nonwhite:
Coefficient .033 .030 2.008
(.015)** (.018)* (.012)
Observations 85,402 71,854 86,345
Age:
Coefficient 2.571 2.975 2.068
(.336)* (.420)** (.276)
Observations 85,402 71,854 86,345
Retake test:
Coefficient .047 2.484
(.013)** (.009)**
Observations 85,402 86,345
Prior earnings:
Coefficient 277.58 21.14 220.48
(91.95) (105.23) (72.59)
Observations 85,402 71,854 86,345
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes test scores
from 1500 to 3000. Prior earnings are measured in the quarter before the GED
attempt. The sample in col. 1 is the set of individuals taking the test for the last
time between 1995 and 2005; col. 2 is the subset of individuals in col. 1 who take
the test only once. The sample in col. 3 is the set of individuals taking the test
for the first time between 1995 and 2005.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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It is clear that the final test score fails basic specification tests for a run-
ning variable (see Imbens and Lemieux 2008; McCrary 2008). The cen-
tral assumption of the RD model will be violated insofar as observed dif-
ferences in demographic variables imply a discontinuity in the outcome
of interest (Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw 2001). Although it would
be possible to control for these measures, a more important source of
bias is potential differences in unmeasured factors, which could well
be strongly associated with the outcomes of interest. For example, those
who are most willing to retake the test could be individuals with noncog-
nitive traits that make themmost likely to succeed in the labor market. If
this were the case, those with scores just below the threshold—dispropor-
tionately individuals who chose not to retake the test—might well have
lower earnings than those just above the threshold because of such dif-
ferences. Standard RD methods would mistakenly identify this differ-
ence as due to GED certification.
One strategy to avoid this problem would be to limit consideration to
the cases in which individuals have not taken the test a second time.
Lofstrom and Tyler (2008) limit their sample in this way as a robustness
check for their RD estimation approach. Figure 2 presents the distribu-
tion of scores for individuals who took the test for the first time in the
period 1995–2005 and did not take the test a second time through
2008. Themost notable observation is that amarked discontinuity is pres-
ent just as in the final test score. This similarity indicates that the discon-
tinuity identified in the final score in large part reflects depletion of
scores just below the threshold, because individuals with these scores
FIG. 2.—Distribution of first test score for single test takers: 1995–2005
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are very likely to retake the test. Table 2 (col. 2) indicates that disconti-
nuities in the demographic variables exist with this score and that pat-
terns are similar to those for the final score.
An alternative is to use the first test score as the continuous variable
underlying GED certification. As noted above, GED certification is not
predicted perfectly by the first score. Some individuals who score below
the threshold retake the test and pass it, and some who score above the
threshold do not meet the subtest requirement. However, there is a
strong discontinuity in the relationship between first test score and ulti-
mate GED certification, allowing us to apply a fuzzy regression disconti-
nuity (FRD) design.11 The assumptions underlying the FRD design imply
that the first test score will display continuous relationships with all pre-
existing individual characteristics. Table 2 (col. 3) shows that there is no
discontinuity in the demographic measures for individuals around this
threshold. Figure 3 presents the distribution of the first test score, using
the same method to identify discontinuities as for the densities above.
The figure shows that, in contrast to the final score and the score for
those taking the test only once, there is essentially no discontinuity in
the density at the 2250 threshold. This measure is therefore suitable
for an FRD design.
IV. Applying FRD Methods
Because individuals at or above the test threshold are appreciably more
likely to receive GED certification than those below, these data are ap-
propriate for an FRD design. The equation predicting GED certification
is12
GED5 ag 1 ag rDr 1 o
p
j51
bg lj ½Dl ðT 2 2250Þj
1o
p
j51
bg r j ½Dr ðT 2 2250Þj 1 X dg 1 ε;
ð1Þ
whereT is the total score on the first GED test, Dl (Dr) is a dummy indi-
cating whether that score is below (equals or exceeds) the passing
threshold, p indicates the order of the polynomial, and X is a vector with
the following set of covariates: earnings in the four quarters prior to first
GED attempt, age, age squared, race, year of first GED test, quarter of
11 We refer to this as an FRD because there are individuals whose score on the first test is
below the threshold but eventually obtain a GED as well as individuals whose score is above
the threshold but fail to obtain a GED. This latter group consists of individuals who fail to
obtain a passing score on all five subsections of the test. Our discussion in Sec. IV includes
more details on both of these groups.
12 The formal model presented here follows closely from that in Imbens and Lemieux
(2008).
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the year (winter, spring, summer, or fall), and dummies for the year in
which the first test was taken. An observation is an individual who takes a
firstGED test. The subscript g identifies coefficients predictingGEDcerti-
fication, so bglj and bgrj identify the relationship of the first GED test score
with certification, below and above the 2250 threshold, respectively. The
estimated parameter agr indicates the discontinuity at the threshold.
Fitting the same structure predicting the outcome variable, we write
Y 5 ay 1 ayrDr 1 o
p
j51
byl j ½DlðT 2 2250Þj
1o
p
j51
byr j ½Dr ðT 2 2250Þj 1 X dy 1 m:
ð2Þ
The estimate of program impact is based on the relative size of the RD
estimated in equation (1) and that estimated in equation (2). Assuming
that the discontinuity in (1) induces the discontinuity in equation (2),
the impact of the program can be written as
 t 5 ayr=ag r : ð3Þ
Figure 4 provides a graph that illustrates the estimation methods un-
derlying equations (1) and (2).13 Here the focus is on earnings in quar-
ter 12. The discontinuity assumed in equation (1) is clearly present in
the data, confirming that those who score at or just above the threshold
13 The figure shows the results from the specification that excludes covariates. The fig-
ure based on a regression specification including covariates has the same pattern as fig. 4.
FIG. 3.—Distribution of first test score: 1995–2005
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on the overall GED score are appreciably more likely to have a GED
12 quarters after taking the test than those scoring just below. The graph
for earnings does not show a discontinuity at this point, suggesting that
there is little impact on quarter 12 earnings.
As Hahn et al. (2001) observe (see also Imbens and Lemieux 2008),
the FRD can be formulated as a parametric instrumental variables (IV)
system, where the treatment variable (GED certification in our case) is
instrumented with the continuous measure and dummy variables captur-
ing the discontinuity. Equation (1) is then the auxiliary equation. The
outcome variable can be fitted with the following specification:
Y 5 a1 tdGED 1 o
p
j51
bl j ½Dl ðT 2 2250Þj
1o
p
j51
br j ½Dr ðT 2 2250Þj 1 X d1 ϑ;
ð4Þ
where dGED is the predicted value from equation (1).14 Because the poly-
nomial is of the same order as in equations (1), (2), and (4), estimates of
t based on equations (1)–(3) are numerically identical to those based on
equations (1) and (4). Hence, in either case, it is the estimated discon-
tinuities in the treatment and outcome variables that determine the im-
pact estimate, t. Since estimating equations (1) and (4) as a parametric IV
system is simpler and allows us to estimate standard errors using standard
statistical software, this is how we estimate our main results from the FRD
model. The reported standard errors for the second-stage equation re-
flect the fact that the GED measure in the equation is estimated. As a ro-
bustness check, we also use alternative methods based on linear versions
of equations (1) and (2), which we describe below.
In common with other estimates based on RD methods, the validity of
estimates depends on the assumption that all factors other than GED
certification that are associated with the GED test score and influence
outcomes are captured by our function of test score in the range of
the threshold. If such factors were to change discontinuously at the
threshold, this would not be captured by our smooth polynomial and
would therefore induce bias in estimated GED effect estimates. We
doubt that such factors are important, however, since employees have
no way to provide employers with information on their scores other than
GED certification itself.
The FRD provides an estimate of program impact for a subset of the
population with an initial test score near the threshold, those whose
GED certification is determined by whether they are above or below
14 Estimated coefficients and error terms differ from those reported in eq. (2). Conse-
quently, the subscript notation has been altered to reflect this.
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the threshold, often referred to as “compliers.” Estimates for agr reported
in table 3 (below) indicate that about a third of test takers near the
threshold are compliers. Among those who satisfy the subtest require-
ment on the first test, compliers are those who would not retake the
exam even if their score was just below the threshold and those who
would retake it but would not pass the threshold.15 Among those who
do not satisfy the subtest requirement, compliers are those who would
retake the test and satisfy the subtest requirement only if their overall
first test score was above the threshold.
Our tabulations show that those who pass the subtest requirement but
choose not to retake the test make up about 40 percent of compliers,
those who pass the subtest requirement and retake the test without pass-
ing the threshold make up about 20 percent, and those who do not pass
the subtest requirement but who retake the test and pass the subtest re-
quirement if their overall score is above the threshold make up about
40 percent of compliers.16 Note that for those with initial scores just
below the threshold, table 1 indicates that 31 percent choose not to re-
take the test, implying that such individuals are slightly overrepresented
among compliers.
Although we do not know whether there are differences in GED im-
pact for compliers as compared to others with scores at the cutoff point,
in their review of the literature, Heckman et al. (2014) find few impor-
tant differences by measured characteristics aside from the results show-
ing that women who obtain a GED are more likely to obtain employ-
ment. As noted above, some researchers have argued that lower-ability
individuals have greater returns to the GED (Murnane et al. 2000; Tyler
et al. 2003), but Heckman, Humphries, and Mader (2011) reject this
claim. In the discussion that follows, we assume that our estimates iden-
tify the effects of the GED for all recipients.
As noted above, our basic sample includes individuals who first take
the GED test in 1995–2005. We exclude those who first take the test in
2006–8 because these individuals do not have sufficient earnings and ed-
ucation data after their initial GED test score. In addition, the sample is
limited to individuals with initial test scores between 1500 and 3000 be-
cause the observed relationship between test score and GED receipt is
irregular below 1500 (many of these individuals do not take all the
subtests). Substantive conclusions were not altered by this truncation, al-
though precision of estimates was somewhat improved. This approach
eliminated 8 percent of the cases below the threshold and 12 percent
of the cases above the threshold. About 37 percent of those with scores
15 In contrast, noncompliers are individuals who retake the test and pass the threshold.
16 The first two are calculated from the sample of individuals with initial test scores in the
range 2200–2240, just below the threshold; the third is calculated as a residual.
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below 1500 ultimately obtain certification; virtually all those with scores
over 3000 are certified. For the remainder of the paper, we will refer to
the regression analysis sample as the full sample. In keeping with previ-
ous GED research, all regressions are estimated separately for men and
women.
We estimate a separate regression for each of our three dependent var-
iables in each quarter after the initial GED test attempt. The first depen-
dent variable is quarterly earnings. The second measure is employment,
a dichotomous variable equal to one for individuals with positive earn-
ings in the quarter. An analysis of employment is insightful when study-
ing disadvantaged populations with low employment levels such as GED
test takers. The final measure is an indicator of whether the individual
enrolled in public postsecondary education in the state at any time dur-
ing the quarter, based on records maintained by the state. Earnings and
employment outcomes are available for 30 quarters after the initial GED
attempt, whereas postsecondary enrollment is available for 16 quarters
after the initial GED attempt. So we estimate 30 separate quarterly re-
gressions for earnings and employment and 16 separate regressions
for postsecondary attendance. For each equation, the order of the poly-
nomial is two, although we also fitted higher-order polynomials and ob-
tained similar results.
V. Results
Table 3 presents estimates based on equation (1), the first stage of the
two-stage equation, applied to quarter 12.17 In table 3, the dependent
variable is a dichotomous variable for passing the GED test. Note that
the first-stage estimates for the three second-stage outcomes (quarterly
income, employment, and postsecondary enrollment) are identical be-
cause they are all based on the same sample and the same first-stage re-
gression. The discontinuity at the threshold for the first test is associated
with a 34 percentage point increase in the likelihood that men obtain
GED certification and a 30 percentage point increase for women.
Parameter estimates for the GED impact from the basic model in
equation (4), estimated separately for men and women, are presented
in tables 4–6. Column 1 in each table contains the estimated impact,
t, and its standard error, as identified by the discontinuity in dGED from
the first-stage equation (1). Each coefficient (and standard error) is
17 The results from other quarters show a very similar pattern. Results from the first-stage
equation differ from quarter to quarter because the dependent variable is GED certifica-
tion as of the beginning of the quarter and because the sample size varies since the number
of quarters of data differs by the year in which the test is taken and a small number of out-
liers were omitted from the earnings and employment analyses. Estimates are not affected
by the latter omissions, although standard errors are reduced.
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from a separate regression in which the outcome applies to the indicated
quarter.
In table 4, the dependent variable is earnings for each quarter from
one to 30 quarters after the initial GED test attempt. Although the esti-
mated coefficients vary from quarter to quarter, for men, in quarters 5–9,
four coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent level
(two-sided test) and one is significant at the 10 percent level. We can re-
ject the hypothesis that the 30 coefficients are jointly zero at the 5 per-
cent level. The largest estimated coefficient is nearly $600, or 23 percent
of the mean earnings, and the other significant estimates range from
$297 (12 percent of the mean earnings) to $438 (17 percent). However,
no coefficient for any later quarter is statistically significant. When we es-
timate a model of the GED impact on total discounted earnings (with a
discount rate equal to either the consumer price index [CPI] or the CPI
plus 5 percent), the GED impact is 8 percent of the present value of earn-
ings for the 30 observed quarters and is not significant at the 10 percent
level (see online App. B). For women, one estimate is significant at the
10 percent level, and at $506 this amounts to 20 percent of mean earn-
ings. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 30 coefficients
are jointly zero at the 10 percent level.
One obvious factor that may reduce earnings for GED recipients would
be enrollment in postsecondary education. In Appendix B, we repro-
duced our earnings analysis limiting the sample to those not enrolled
in public postsecondary education during that quarter. The results from
this sample were similar to the results reported in the tables. We also es-
timated effects taking the dependent variable as log earnings rather than
earnings, limiting consideration to those with positive earnings in the
TABLE 3
First-Stage Results for Quarter 12
Dependent Variable: GED Receipt
Men Women
Discontinuity .33984 (.00675)** .30127 (.00663)**
Linear—left .00190 (.00004)** .00250 (.00005)**
Linear—right .00061 (.00003)** .00055 (.00003)**
Quadratic—left .00205 (.00007)** .00289 (.00008)**
Quadratic—right 2.00061 (.00004)** 2.00056 (.00003)**
Observations 44,378 41,967
Adjusted R2 .5968 .6154
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Controls include earnings in
each of four prior quarters, nonwhite dummy, age, age squared, three dum-
mies for the four quarters in a year, a dummy for each year the test was taken,
and a constant.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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quarter.18 Impact estimates in this specification were qualitatively similar
to those in our base analyses.
In table 5 the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable for em-
ployment, measured as having positive earnings in the quarter. Just
one of the coefficients in the table is statistically significant at the 5 per-
cent level, and only three coefficients have absolute values greater than
0.04 (8 percent of the mean). About a third of the estimates are negative.
For both men and women, we cannot reject the joint hypothesis that all
18 Appendix B also contains a specification in which the dependent variable is the earn-
ings level (not log), but the sample is limited to individuals with positive earnings. Again,
the results are similar to those of the base analysis.
TABLE 4
Estimated GED Impact on Earnings
Men Women
Quarters since
1st GED Test
Coefficient
(1)
Observations
(2)
Coefficient
(3)
Observations
(4)
1 225.6 (74.8) 44,378 259.1 (62.2) 41,967
2 92.4 (106.5) 44,377 272.5 (90.9) 41,967
3 64.6 (133.8) 44,378 45.1 (124.7) 41,965
4 69.8 (155.5) 44,378 3.1 (135.9) 41,967
5 297.5 (168.6)* 44,377 7.2 (153.4) 41,964
6 430.3 (182.5)** 44,377 120.4 (167.5) 41,967
7 429.5 (195.8)** 44,377 99.2 (183.9) 41,963
8 437.6 (207.6)** 44,376 36.9 (202.3) 41,967
9 598.7 (217.8)** 44,378 142.8 (207.4) 41,966
10 182.4 (228.1) 44,378 127.5 (217.9) 41,964
11 335.2 (234.3) 44,378 201.0 (223.5) 41,967
12 59.0 (242.8) 44,378 162.9 (236.8) 41,967
13 137.1 (249.6) 44,378 114.2 (239.5) 41,967
14 129.7 (255.0) 44,378 334.0 (245.9) 41,966
15 70.0 (266.9) 44,378 409.7 (252.3) 41,966
16 10.0 (268.7) 44,378 376.8 (256.9) 41,967
17 205.1 (272.6) 44,377 136.0 (274.5) 41,966
18 182.6 (279.3) 44,377 218.4 (268.8) 41,967
19 162.4 (283.1) 43,647 190.3 (273.1) 41,336
20 111.8 (291.5) 42,919 291.6 (282.4) 40,661
21 204.6 (303.5) 41,918 213.0 (290.5) 39,799
22 306.6 (314.0) 41,178 506.0 (307.3)* 39,092
23 295.5 (329.7) 40,483 331.2 (301.1) 38,400
24 159.8 (342.1) 39,783 378.2 (318.7) 37,726
25 493.4 (329.0) 38,966 210.0 (319.4) 36,843
26 178.2 (332.2) 38,261 2102.4 (322.6) 36,171
27 214.4 (338.6) 37,595 213.5 (321.3) 35,521
28 331.2 (341.1) 36,944 136.3 (328.3) 34,860
29 135.4 (350.5) 35,983 283.5 (329.6) 34,364
30 36.0 (358.8) 35,146 2277.7 (334.4) 33,982
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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coefficients are zero. As with earnings, the results for employment are
not sensitive to the inclusion of individuals attending postsecondary ed-
ucation during the quarter.
As mentioned above, Heckman et al. (2014) find that, in some cases,
female GED recipients have higher annual earnings and employment
than the full set of female dropouts. In contrast, we find similar labor
market outcomes for female GED test takers whether or not they obtain
GED certification. Heckman et al. show that the GED effect for women is
most pronounced for the subset of women who rarely work. Since such
women are unlikely to take the test, reported positive effects of the GED
may actually be capturing unmeasured motivation. Our sample is lim-
ited to those who take the GED, so our comparison groups have similar
levels of motivation.
TABLE 5
Estimated GED Impact on Employment
Men Women
Quarters since
1st GED Test
Coefficient
(1)
Observations
(2)
Coefficient
(3)
Observations
(4)
1 .015 (.017) 44,378 2.009 (.017) 41,967
2 2.004 (.022) 44,377 2.013 (.022) 41,967
3 .037 (.027) 44,378 2.011 (.027) 41,965
4 .010 (.029) 44,378 2.015 (.030) 41,967
5 .029 (.031) 44,377 .011 (.033) 41,964
6 .013 (.032) 44,377 .003 (.035) 41,967
7 .007 (.033) 44,377 .039 (.038) 41,963
8 .026 (.034) 44,376 .017 (.039) 41,967
9 .024 (.036) 44,378 .009 (.040) 41,966
10 .016 (.036) 44,378 .002 (.041) 41,964
11 .007 (.036) 44,378 2.014 (.042) 41,967
12 2.022 (.037) 44,378 .020 (.043) 41,967
13 2.035 (.037) 44,378 2.018 (.043) 41,967
14 .026 (.037) 44,378 .070 (.044) 41,966
15 .040 (.038) 44,378 .091 (.045)** 41,966
16 .018 (.038) 44,378 .048 (.045) 41,967
17 .014 (.038) 44,377 .017 (.045) 41,966
18 .039 (.038) 44,377 .022 (.046) 41,967
19 .022 (.039) 43,647 2.001 (.046) 41,336
20 .023 (.039) 42,919 .048 (.047) 40,661
21 2.019 (.040) 41,918 .019 (.048) 39,799
22 2.008 (.040) 41,178 .017 (.049) 39,092
23 .004 (.041) 40,483 2.014 (.049) 38,400
24 2.017 (.041) 39,783 2.006 (.050) 37,726
25 .037 (.041) 38,966 .010 (.050) 36,843
26 2.012 (.041) 38,261 .021 (.050) 36,171
27 2.003 (.041) 37,595 .016 (.050) 35,521
28 .015 (.041) 36,944 .002 (.051) 34,860
29 2.001 (.042) 35,983 2.017 (.050) 34,364
30 2.040 (.043) 35,146 .005 (.051) 33,982
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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Our finding that the GED affects men’s earnings is at variance with
most of the analyses based on comparing GED recipients and other
dropouts using regression methods, which do not generally find effects.
We do not emphasize these different results for several reasons. First, the
positive earnings effects fade quickly, and there is no evidence that pass-
ing the GED has any long-term impact on men’s earnings (the effect on
the present value of earnings is not statistically significant). Second, we
find no evidence of an increase in the probability of working for men in
any quarter. Third, we estimate a large number of quarterly parameters,
and some may be statistically significant by chance. Finally, it is useful to
keep in mind that our sample differs from that of previous analyses that
include both test takers and non–test takers, and effects may differ for
this group.
Table 6 presents results for enrollment in the state’s public postsec-
ondary institutions. For men, GED certification is associated with in-
creased postsecondary enrollment of 3–4 percentage points in the first
three quarters after the test. We also see a positive effect of 3 percentage
points in quarter 10. These are substantial effects, given that the base en-
rollment level is under 8 percent. In other quarters, the effect is not sta-
tistically significant. For women, the effect is even larger.19 GED certifica-
tion is associated with a statistically significant increase in the likelihood
of postsecondary attendance for the first five quarters after the initial
GED attempt. The effect size is 8 percentage points in the first quarter
after the test, and it declines to 5 percentage points in the fifth quarter
after the test, compared to a mean enrollment of 8–10 percent. In sub-
sequent quarters, the effect continues to decline, and it is not statistically
different from zero after quarter 7.
The fact that passing the GED is associated with increased postsecond-
ary education attendance but is not associated with higher earnings or
employment can be explained by the low levels of postsecondary educa-
tion obtained by GED recipients. Jepsen, Mueser, and Troske (2015)
show that passing the GED is associated with an increase of approxi-
mately two credit hours for men and five credit hours for women, trivi-
ally small attainment levels given that a full year of study normally entails
30 credit hours.
All reported estimates suffer from sizable standard errors as is typical
in IV models. As noted above, in an effort to improve the estimation
equations, these results are from models that control for demographic
characteristics, employment prior to taking the GED, and other factors.
The exclusion of these measures increased the standard errors by as
much as one-third in the quarters immediately following the first GED
test, but the pattern of results was nearly identical to that of the reported
19 For both men and women, we can reject the hypothesis that the 16 GED coefficients
are jointly zero at the 5 percent level.
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results. Because the test changed in 2002 (and prior test scores were no
longer accepted at that point), we fitted models allowing the slope of the
test score on GED certification and the dependent variable to differ by
period. We also fitted the full model separately for the period prior to
and after the implementation of the new test in 2002, as well as in a sam-
ple omitting 2001 and 2002. In none of these models were results sub-
stantively different from those we report.
Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest using multiple methods, both para-
metric and nonparametric, for conducting RD analysis. As a robustness
test, we obtained parameter estimates and standard errors based on a lo-
cal linear regression approach using software developed by Fuji, Imbens,
and Kalyanaraman (2009), which, in essence, specifies a linear regres-
sion on each side of the threshold. In this approach, the choice of band-
width is critical. Power improves as bandwidth increases, but if there is
any nonlinearity in the relationship between the running variable and
the outcome, larger bandwidths induce greater bias. Because standard
formulas for optimal bandwidth were unstable, we obtained estimates
for a large number of bandwidths, varying from as little as 30 points
(four data points) to as large as 750 points (76 data points). In no case
were inferences based on these analyses seriously at variance with those
presented above; nor were the impact estimates more precise.20
20 This software calculates effect estimates as the ratio of estimated discontinuities, cor-
responding to eqq. (1)–(3), but with no covariates. As noted in the derivation of eqq. (1)–
TABLE 6
Estimated GED Impact on Postsecondary Enrollment
Men Women
Quarters since
1st GED Test
Coefficient
(1)
Observations
(2)
Coefficient
(3)
Observations
(4)
1 .040 (.010)** 44,378 .081 (.012)** 41,967
2 .044 (.012)** 44,378 .067 (.015)** 41,967
3 .030 (.014)** 44,378 .042 (.018)** 41,967
4 .021 (.015) 44,378 .058 (.019)** 41,967
5 .016 (.016) 44,378 .053 (.021)** 41,967
6 .012 (.016) 44,378 .041 (.022)* 41,967
7 2.003 (.016) 44,378 .038 (.023)* 41,967
8 2.001 (.016) 44,378 .030 (.023) 41,967
9 .019 (.016) 44,378 .033 (.023) 41,967
10 .030 (.016)* 44,378 .014 (.023) 41,967
11 .019 (.015) 44,378 .020 (.023) 41,967
12 .005 (.015) 44,378 2.002 (.023) 41,967
13 2.003 (.015) 44,378 2.009 (.022) 41,967
14 .009 (.014) 44,378 2.006 (.022) 41,967
15 .006 (.014) 44,378 2.021 (.022) 41,967
16 .005 (.014) 44,378 2.004 (.022) 41,967
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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To address the volatility of quarterly labor market outcomes for this
low-skilled population, we also estimated models in which we considered
aggregate measures of earnings and employment based on 1–2 years of
data. Estimates of standard errors (relative to themean) were reduced by
up to 44 percent by this approach, but the substantive conclusions were
not affected. For women, in no case were estimated effects on earnings
statistically significant, and effects of earnings for men were not signifi-
cant after year 3. We also estimated models in which employment was
temporally aggregated and found that, as in the case of individual quar-
ters, no impact estimates were statistically significant.
Our FRD model differs substantially from the RD models previously
estimated for the GED. Previous work estimates a sharp regression dis-
continuity (SRD) based on the score obtained from a composite that in-
cludes the last test attempt of the GED. Results in table 2 show that the
retaking behavior causes a discontinuity in the characteristics at the
threshold for GED certification, suggesting that there may be important
preexisting differences at this threshold that would bias such SRD esti-
mates. In order to examine this possibility, we estimated SRD models
of the GED using our sample of GED test takers.21 For men’s earnings,
the SRD model found positive effects of the GED in later quarters, sug-
gesting that passing the GED resulted in persistently higher earnings,
whereas the FRD model showed no significant earnings gains after quar-
ter 9. For women, the SRD estimates of earnings effects increase dramat-
ically over the period of the study, with positive effects exceeding $400 in
later quarters, most of them easily statistically significant at the 5 percent
level; in contrast, estimates based on our FRD included only a single mar-
ginally significant estimate.
Differences between model estimates of GED impacts on employment
were also dramatic. For men, the SRD showed negative, although usually
insignificant, effects in the first six quarters and few effects in later quar-
ters, whereas the FRD model showed no significant impacts, with esti-
mates close to zero. For women, the SRD model estimated much larger
positive employment impacts than the FRDmodel, with most statistically
significant at the 5 percent level in later quarters. The difference in the
21 Our SRD methods were designed to correspond to those of Tyler (2004). Following
his procedure, we omitted cases in which the subtest requirement was not met to ensure
that the test score threshold corresponded to GED certification. Results were essentially
the same when we included these cases and used the final test score as a forcing variable
in an FRD. Results are presented in App. B.
(4), these estimates are identical to those obtained using an IV system based on a linear
functional form, but standard error estimates differ. We found that when we fitted the com-
parable IV model, standard errors were usually within a few percent of those obtained
here, and in no case did differences influence substantive conclusions. We also estimated
the comparable IV model with alternative bandwidths controlling for the same variables
used in our main analyses, yielding substantively identical results. These alternative speci-
fication results are provided in App. B.
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patterns of estimates based on the SRD and FRD for women is consistent
with a positive selection story for women who take the test multiple
times, similar to the selection suggested in Heckman et al. (2014).
The SRD and FRD models produced different patterns of results for
postsecondary enrollment as well. For both men and women, the FRD
model estimates declined over time and eventually became statistically
insignificant and close to zero six to 12 quarters after the initial GED at-
tempt, whereas the SRD results declined only slightly over time, produc-
ing statistically significant enrollment effects in every quarter for men
and women.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated how one can apply a valid regression
discontinuity approach to a situation in which a treatment is based on
a test score and individuals can influence the test score by retaking the
test. We use this technique to estimate the effect of the GED test, because
test takers can take the test multiple times in a 2-year period and there-
fore can affect their score in the immediate neighborhood of the pass-
ing threshold. We find that the effect of GED certification is small and
generally not statistically significant in the long run for both men and
women, but the GED is associated with a positive earnings increment
in quarters 6–9 for men. We find a positive association between passing
the GED and postsecondary enrollment of up to 4 percentage points for
men and 8 percentage points for women. Given that less than 12 percent
of the population of GED test takers enrolls in postsecondary institutions
in any given quarter, this impact is substantial, and given that many post-
secondary institutions require the GED or other certification, it suggests
that the GED meets a perceived need for these individuals. However,
these effects decline over time, becoming insignificant after the first year
for men and after the second year for women. Our other work suggests
that such enrollment contributes little to educational achievement.
Our results are robust to implementing the FRD technique as a local
linear model or to the exclusion of demographic variables and prior
earnings. However, our results are sensitive to the choice of the FRD ap-
proach as opposed to the SRD approach. The fragility of our results to
the choice of technique demonstrates the importance of ensuring that
the underlying assumptions of the RD estimator are met in the data.
In common with other analyses based on an RD methodology, our re-
sults formally apply only to those near the test threshold whose certifica-
tion is influenced by their score relative to the threshold. It is possible
that the returns to the GED for this group are lower than those of other
GED recipients, but other research does not suggest that such heteroge-
neity is very likely. Given our use of administrative data on test takers, our
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results apply only to high school dropouts who are motivated enough to
take the GED and may not generalize to high school dropouts who do
not take the GED. Also, our analysis does not capture any direct effects
of student studying on labor market outcomes. If those who study for the
GED—whether or not they pass it—obtain valuable skills that improve
their labor market opportunities, such benefits will not be captured in
our analysis. Given that the typical GED test taker spends fewer than
40 hours studying for the test, such benefits are likely to be minimal
for most test takers; but for the small group who put in substantial time
studying, our approach could omit benefits they receive.
For high school dropouts near the GED passing thresholds, our find-
ings do not support the view that GED certification is of use in helping
them escape their disadvantaged labor market status. Perhaps most trou-
bling, a substantial portion of high school dropouts indicate that they
dropped out because they believed it was easier to obtain a GED than
to complete high school (Heckman et al. 2012). Insofar as additional
time in school would have benefited those who drop out, the GED
may have reduced the labor market success of GED test takers. At the
very least, the results in this paper lend further support to the growing
body of evidence showing that GED recipients’ labor market options
are essentially equivalent to those of similar high school dropouts.
Appendix A
TABLE A1
Descriptive Statistics: Demographics
Men (%) Women (%)
Year 1st GED test:
1995–2000 60.6 63.2
2001 13.2 13.2
2002–5 20.8 19.0
Nonwhite 21.6 19.9
GED certification 80.4 81.6
Observations 44,378 41,967
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